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Grievance Arbitration 
A Model for the Study of Policy Change 
Jeffrey Gandz 
A model is developed which explains the factors in-
volve d in a trade union's décision to près s a grievance to 
arbitration. This model is then used to analyze the impact 
of policy initiatives designed to reduce the costs of arbi-
tration, speed up the process and facilitate médiation prior 
to arbitration. Finally a number of research stratégies for 
validating the model are proposed and discussed. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual model 
identifying the major factors influencing a trade union's décision to go to 
arbitration on a grievance arising during the life of a collective agree-
ment. This model is used to analyze the probable impact on arbitration 
case volume of législative and administrative changes designed to speed 
up the procédure, reduce the costs to unions and facilitate médiation 
prior to arbitration. The implications of such changes are discussed from 
the management, union and public policy perspectives. A number of 
potential research stratégies for validating the hypothèses suggested 
by this model are proposed and discussed. 
While this paper deals specifically with the province of Ontario, 
the analysis is generally applicable to a number of Canadian and U.S. 
jurisdictions which call for mandatory binding arbitration for seulement 
of grievances during the life of a collective agreement. 
BACKGROUND 
Binding arbitration, as the terminal stage in the grievance procé-
dure, is compulsory in the Cana-
dian fédéral jurisdiction and in ail 
provinces except Saskatchewan. i 
Mandatory in only a few states in 
1
 Section 37(1) in the Ontario Labour Relations Act (1975) is fairly typical of 
Canadian provincial législation. 
A review of other Canadian labour législation may be found in The Grievance Arbitra-
tion Process in Canada, Labour Canada, Fédéral Médiation and Concilliation Service, 
Ottawa, 1976. 
GANDZ, J. Lecturer, Faculty of Ad-
ministrative Study, York University, 
Downsview, Ontario 
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the U.S., and not mandatory in the important fédéral jurisdiction, it is a 
feature of 94% of ail U.S. collective agreements.2 
Although the acceptance of binding arbitration appears to be wide-
spread, there is substantial criticism of the way in which the procédure 
opérâtes, particularly from trade unions in Ontario. They cite the length 
of time it takes to process a case through arbitration, shown in one study 
to average seven months, as a déniai of justice to the grievor, partic-
ularly if a discharge or other severe penalty is involved.3 The provision 
in some jurisdictions that the union should pay half the cost of arbi-
tration has been stated to be a disincentive for unions with limited 
financial resources to pursue worthwhile, justifiable grievances to 
arbitration.4 The unions are critical of the extremely formai, legalistic 
nature of proceedings and awards, claiming that this inhibits witnesses 
and other participants and renders the findings incompréhensible.5 They 
criticize the fréquent judicial review of arbitration awards, claiming that 
this forces a reliance on the inappropriate common law of contract 
rather than facilitating the émergence of a « common law of the work-
place» relevant to labour-management relationships.6 While the unions 
would like to see government policy initiatives to remedy thèse defi-
ciencies, they hâve stopped short of recommending spécifie législative, 
regulatory or administrative changes. 
Those who would like to see the current procédure continue 
unchanged feel that its deficiencies are within the power of the parties 
to a collective agreement to correct.7 They point to the fact that the 
parties hâve the freedom to specify their own arbitration System, 
providing it falls within the broad guidelines established by législation. 
2
 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Bulletin 1425-6, Arbitration 
Procédures. 
3
 H. GOLDBLATT. «Justice Delaved». Labour Council of Metropolitan 
Toronto. 1974. pp. 11-13 A study of grievances in the United States indicated an average 
of 8.5 months from grievance to award. P. DAVIS and G. C. PATI, « Elapsed time pat-
terns in labor grievance arbitration 1942-72. « The Arbitration Journal V. 29 No. 1, March 
1974. pp. 15-27. 
4
 The issue of cost to the union was the subject of a number of briefs, includ-
ing those of the National Union of Public Service Employées and the U.A.W., to the 
Attorney-General's Committee on the Process of Arbitration in Ontario, 1962. 
5
 Laberge has used the term « a ritualized légal gavotte » to describe the current 
practice of arbitration in Canada. R. LABERGE, «A look at arbitration of rights disputes. » 
The Labour Gazette, V. 75, No. 7, July 1975. pp. 443-8. 
6
 Op. cit. Note 4. 
7
 H. J. CLAWSON, «Grievance arbitration-alive and well. » The Labour Ga-
zette, V. 75, No. 7, July 1975. pp. 449-52. 
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The provisions for expedited, simplified arbitration in the INCO-U.S.W. 
collective agreement at Sudbury8 or the use by many U.S. organizations 
of the expedited arbitration procédure of the American Arbitration 
Association are frequently cited as examples.9 Those who advocate 
«no change» believe that any moves to reduce the costs of arbitration, 
or make it simpler to use, will encourage its use and hence the reliance 
on third parties to settle disputes which should be sorted out by the 
parties themselves. Inhérent in this is the belief that solutions reached 
through bi-lateral negotiations are superior to those reached through 
third party arbitration, either in their quality or the degree to which 
they will be accepted by the parties. 
There has been a great deal written about arbitration by both 
practitioners and académies involved in labour law and industrial 
relations. There has not been any systematic research effort directed 
at developing a greater understanding of the factors involved in déci-
sions to go to arbitration on a grievance. The model presented in this 
paper attempts to integrate established concepts of labour relations 
climate, conflict types, collective bargaining relationships and décision 
making in an overall framework which will identify those factors and 
provide a model for the analysis of policy change and the future guid-
ance of research stratégies. 
THE MODEL 
The dépendent variable in this model is the choice, by the trade 
union, of alternative ways of dealing with a grievance that is not satis-
factorily settled through the intra-organizational grievance procédure. 
The union is seen as having three alternatives. It may refer the grievance 
to arbitration, make it an agenda item for collective bargaining or 
abandon it altogether. 
This choice will be based on the union's perception of the appro-
priateness of each of the alternatives for the actual grievance in question 
and, where more than one alternative is feasible, the one offering the 
greatest expected utility. The interaction of climate and conflict type 
perception will détermine the appropriateness of alternatives. The 
8
 Teamwork in Industry. V. 30, No. 4, April 1973. 
9
 See, for example, SCHLAGER, W. L. « Expedited arbitration on the LIRR. » 
The Arbitration Journal. V. 30. No. 4, December, 1975. For a more critical review of 
expedited arbitration processes see S. E. KANE, «Current developments in expedited 
arbitration. » Labor Law Journal. V. 24, No. 4 April 1973. pp. 282-7. 
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subjectively expected utilities of the alternatives will be a function of 
the probabilities of winning and the costs and benefits associated with 
each of them. Thèse costs and benefits will be influenced by the balance 
of power between labour and management, intra-union political consid-
érations and the légal and administrative framework within which both 
arbitration and collective bargaining function. Finally, a number of 
timing considérations will affect the choice of alternatives. 
FIGURE 1 
A model of procédure choice 
Labour Relations Climate 
+ 
Conflict Type 
COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
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GRIEVANCE • GRIEVANCE > V ^ • NO ACTION 
PROCEDURE 1 
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Intra-Union Politics — >—*+•* Costs-Benefits 
ARBITRATION 
i>~ 
Légal-Administrative <~~——~ • Timing 
Framework 
The grievance pathway 
This model will be limited to the discussion of grievances initiated 
by the union as a resuit of some action taken by management. It is 
acknowledged that certain grievances are initiated by managements but 
thèse are few and far between. 
In the context of this model «the union» refers to the person or 
persons in a trade union organization who make décisions with respect 
to arbitration. The titles or rôles of such people will vary from one 
union to the next. There may be a single person involved or there may 
be a committee ; the locus of décision making may shift as the grievance 
passes through various stages in the pathway; there may or may 
not be involvement of union officers or staff outside the local either in 
an advisory or décision making capacity. The dominant mode is believed 
to be a décision made by the elected officiais of the local with the advice 
of the professional staff of the national or régional organization. The 
extent to which this, or other modes of décision making predominate 
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is a matter for empirical détermination and may hâve a bearing on the 
time it takes to process a grievance. 
Figure 1 depicts the pathway taken by a grievance. Initially it 
is dealt with in the grievance procédure established in the collective 
agreement. This is usually a multi-stage procédure in which a grievance 
is presented informally to first-line supervision and then more formally 
through two or three levels of management usually ending up at some 
joint union-management committee where management will give its 
final word and the union will indicate whether it is prepared to pursue 
the matter to arbitration or drop it.10 
If the grievance is not dropped the union has two alternatives. The 
union may décide that it will seek arbitration and will so inform man-
agement. At that time management, faced with going to arbitration, may 
décide to reconsider its position so opening up the internai grievance 
procédure once more. Alternatively the union may décide that the 
grievance should be made an agenda item for the next round of nego-
tiations on some upcoming collective agreement. 
Procédure characteristics 
The use of the grievance procédure and collective bargaining as 
alternatives will be considered in this model largely to be determined 
by the timing constraints and the costs-benefits associated with each. 
They are both procédures within which bargaining takes place.n Walton 
and McKersie described four basic forms of bargaining. Distributive 
bargaining takes place when the parties hâve a clear conflict of interest 
and the situation is clearly «fixed-sum» in nature. Integrative bargain-
ing takes place in « variable-sum » situations where the issue has the 
potential for both sides benefitting from its resolution, although not 
necessarily to the same extent. Attitudinal structuring refers to the 
ways in which the parties in labour negotiations seek to modify the 
attitudes of their opponents and intra-organizational bargaining describes 
10
 There are many descriptions of the grievance procédure in the literature includ-
ing: J. W. KUHN. «The Grievance Procédure», in J. T. DUNLOP and N. W. CHAM-
BERLAIN (eds.) Frontiers of Collective Bargaining. Harper and Row, New York, 1967. 
A.W.J. THOMSON. The Grievance Procédure in the Private Sector. New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Cornell University, 1974. For an extremely 
extensive discussion of the literature on grievance procédures see; A.W.J. THOMSON 
and V. V. MURRAY. Grievance Procédures. Saxon House/Lexington. Westmead, Hants. 
1976. 
11
 J. W. KUHN. Bargaining in Grievance Seulement. Columbia University 
Press, New York. 1961. p. 71. 
636 INDUSTRIAL RFLATIONS INDUSTRIP7LLFS. VOL. 3i. NO 4 
the processes whereby the negotiators seek to align the expectations of 
their principals with either their own expectations or the reality of the 
bargain struck.12 
The dividing line between bargaining for a new agreement and 
bargaining under the old agreement is not sharp; experienced labour 
negotiators are used to sitting down to negotiations for a new contract 
and finding the first order of business to be the resolution of certain 
individual or policy grievances of long standing. While the relative 
power of the parties in the grievance procédure or the collective bargain-
ing procédure may be altered by, for example, the legality of a strike 
at a particular point of time, the procédures are similar in many other 
respects. 
Weiler has suggested that arbitrators operate in two fundamentally 
distinct modes. An arbitrator may see his rôle as an adjudicator al-
though within this rôle he may view his function either as one of in-
terpreting the spécifie and explicit terms of a contract or its underlying 
meaning. An alternative rôle is that of a «labour relations physician». 
In this rôle the arbitrator sees himself as either a mediator or as an 
industrial policy maker whose job it is to settle industrial disputes with 
an eye to the public interest, however defined.13 
Whether this categorization represents a true dichotomy or only 
points along a spectrum is debatable. The extent to which arbitrators 
function in each of thèse modes is a matter for empirical détermination, 
one that does not appear to hâve yet been made. Weiler suggests that 
the présent corps of arbitrators in Canada works in an adjudication 
mode unless the language of the collective agreement spécifies some 
other rôle.14 
As usually practiced in North America, arbitration is an adversary 
procédure. The parties to the grievance présent reasoned arguments, 
call witnesses, cite précédents and «case law» to either a sole arbitrator 
or a panel chaired by a neutral person. The arbitrator or arbitration 
board is usually empowered to rule on ail matters governed by the 
12
 R. E. WALTON and R. B. MCKERSIE. A Behavioral Theory of Labor Ne-
gotiations. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965. pp. 4-5. 
13
 P. C. WEILER. Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change. Privy Council 
Office, Ottawa. Queens Printer, 1970. pp. 54-75. 
14
 Ibid. 
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collective agreement and awards are not subject to judicial review 
unless natural justice has been contravened or jurisdiction exceeded.15 
The arbitration procédure is not a bargaining procédure if the 
arbitrator sees his rôle as an adjudicator. It is, therefore, fundamentally 
différent to either the grievance procédure or collective bargaining. 
Whereas in the bargaining procédures the parties could bargain inte-
gratively over issues with variable sum pay-off potential, this possibility 
does not exist within the arbitration procédure. It is this différence in 
the nature of the procédures which makes them either appropriate or 
inappropriate for the resolution of différent forms of conflict that arise 
during the life of collective agreements. 
Conflict types 
Grievances are conflict incidents,16 but conflict may take several 
forms.17 Competitive-issue conflict describes issues of common concern 
between parties where their resolution objectives are incompatible. This 
type of conflict usually involves competing for some rare resource and 
may be seen in an industrial relations context in the conflict over the 
share of revenue to go to wages or profits. Disputes over management 
rights, hours, wage and allowance issues or certain disciplinary matters 
are other examples of competitive-issue conflict. Where bargaining takes 
place, competitive-issue conflict becomes the subject of distributive 
bargaining. 
Common-problem conflict does not involve fundamental incom-
patibilities between the parties. The conflict situation holds the potential 
for both parties benefitting from its resolution, although not necessarily 
to the same extent. Examples in the industrial relations setting may 
include conflict over job reassignments in the présence of a well defined 
15
 The question of whether or not jurisdiction has been exceeded is, of course, 
a matter for the courts to décide. Traditionally trade unions hâve wanted far greater ju-
risdiction for the labour arbitrator, facilitating the development of an industrial jurisprudence. 
Managements hâve, in gênerai, wanted to carefully circumscribe the jurisdiction of arbit-
rators and hâve frequently resorted to court action when they feel the arbitrator has 
exceeded the arbitrable issues outlined in the collective agreement. 
16
 Grievances invariably stem from an individual's disagreement over some 
managerial action and represents the institutionalized way of expressing that disagreement. 
Certain policy grievances may not fall into this category but even they represent a form 
of conflict. 
17
 This section draws very heavily on the chapter on conflict by K. THOMAS in: 
Marvin D. DUNNETTE (éd.) Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. 
Rand McNally, Chicago, 1976. pp. 889-935. 
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productivity agreement or technological changes clearly benefitting 
employées as well as improving profits. Although the assignments may 
cause some conflict, there is a benefit to both parties from resolving 
it. If bargaining takes place over such types of conflict, it will be inte-
grative bargaining involving joint problem solving behaviour. 
Mixed-issues conflict is perhaps the most prévalent form and 
covers situations which hâve a mixture of conflict of interest and 
common problems. Whereas with competitive-issue conflict one party's 
satisfaction can corne only at the expense of the other's, and with 
common-problem conflict each party's satisfaction is accompanied by an 
increase in the other's, no such statements can be made about mixed-
issues conflict. It is a «variable-sum, variable-share » form of conflict. 
If bargaining is engaged in, it will take the form of some integrative 
bargaining and some distributive bargaining. 
The final form of conflict type is pseudo-conflict, literally conflict 
which doesn't exist. The industrial relations field is full of such conflicts 
which stem from a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the other 
party's intentions, desires or actions. 
A central thesis of this paper is that the parties to a collective 
agreement will not knowingly sélect a conflict resolution procédure 
which is inappropriate for the type of conflict that exists. Therefore the 
perception of conflict type will be an important independent variable 
in the parties' sélection of conflict resolution procédure. It is hypoth-
esized that if the union perceives that the grievance may involve 
common-problem or pseudo-conflict, or mixed-issue conflict with a 
high common-problem component, it will not be inclined to sélect arbi-
tration for the resolution of a grievance.18 This hypothesis is conditional 
on the union believing that the climate is such that effective integrative 
or mixed bargaining can take place between the union and management. 
Thus the climate is a major variable which will also influence the union's 
sélection décision. 
Labour Relations Climate 
In the context of this paper, labour relations climate refers to the 
pattern of relationship that exists between the union and management 
in an organization. Walton and McKersie describe five such patterns 
18
 The importance of perceptual processes in industrial relations is reviewed 
in R. STAGNER and H. ROSEN, Psychology of Union-Management Relations. Wads-
worth, Belmont, Calif. 1965. pp. 8-20. 
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of relationship including conflict, containment-aggression, accomoda-
tion, coopération and collusion.19 
Conflict describes a pattern of relationship characterized by 
compétitive tendencies between the parties to destroy or weaken each 
other, déniai of legitimacy and extrême distrust or hâte. Containment-
aggression is characterized also by compétitive tendencies but there is a 
grudging acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the other party accom-
panied by distrust and antagonism in the relationship. Accomodation 
is characterized by a «hands-off» policy for each party. They do not 
try to destroy the other, but they also offer no assistance. There is an 
acceptance of the other's legitimacy, limited trust and a neutrality or 
courteousness in their relationships. Coopération describes a pattern 
of relationship in which there is a tendency for the parties to assist 
each other and try to préserve the coopérative relationship. Each 
acknowledges the other's legitimacy completely, there is extended trust 
between them and a degree of friendliness in their relationship. Collu-
sion is characterized by coopérative tendencies based on the potential 
for mutual blackmail rather than on trust and legitimacy. It may be 
found in relationships between unions and employers which benefit 
the leaders of both but not the principals they are supposed to represent, 
in the case of the union, or shareholders or the public at large in the 
case of the employer. 
The climate will hâve an influence on the type of conflict that 
actually occurs, the way in which conflict is perceived and the degree 
to which the parties feel that certain forms of conflict resolution behav-
iour are possible. 
For the sake of simplicity we will assume that collusive relation-
ships are relatively rare and ignore them: their inclusion would not 
invalidate the rest of the argument although it would complicate the 
présentation. We will also simplify even further by referring to the 
climate as good (coopération, accomodation) or poor (containment-
aggression, conflict). 
It is hypothesized that when the climate is poor, more cases of 
pseudo-conflict will arise, more cases of common-problem conflict 
will be incorrectly perceived as competitive-issue conflict and there 
will be no perception of the possibility of engaging in problem-solving, 
integrative bargaining with the other party. In poor climates therefore, 
the resolution of conflict will be as a resuit of distributive bargaining, 
9
 WALTON and MCKERSIE. Op. cit. pp. 185-90. 
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either in the grievance procédure or in collective bargaining, or as a 
resuit of arbitration. 
In good labour relations climates there will be fewer cases of 
pseudo-conflict since such conflicts will tend to be resolved informally, 
prior to the grievance procédure becoming activated. There will be a 
greater tendency to perceive the common-benefit potential in conflict 
situations, even where such may not in fact exist. There will be an 
appréciation of the possibilities of joint problem-solving behaviour and 
a willingness to engage in it. 
Where the climate is good, the union will not seek arbitration of 
a grievance with common-benefit potential. In the first place it is 
probable that integrative bargaining in the grievance procédure, which 
temporally preceeds arbitration, will resuit in satisfactory resolution. 
In the second place the union will recognize the inappropriateness of 
arbitration for such types of conflict and will prefer the issue to be dealt 
with in collective bargaining where integrative bargaining will be 
possible. 
On the other hand, there is the probability that the grievance 
procédure will be ineffective in handling common-problem conflict if the 
climate is poor. In such cases, or for ail cases of true compétitive-
issue conflict, the union that cannot satisfy its objectives thirough the 
grievance procédure must choose between collective bargaining, arbi-
tration or abandoning the grievance. 
The sélection of alternatives 
TIMING 
The grievance procédure temporally preceeds the décision to opt 
for either collective bargaining or arbitration and hence grievances will 
normally be processed through the intra-organizational procédure as a 
matter of course. There may be certain exceptions to this however. 
Sometimes collective agreements may contain deliberately ambiguous 
language; at the time the agreement is negotiated there is a récognition 
of the fact that issues may arise which will require arbitration and a 
tacit understanding that when they do, the parties will abide by an 
arbitration décision.20 Certain forms of grievance may therefore short-
circuit the internai grievance procédure and proceed, by agreement of 
both union and management, to arbitration. Failing resolution in the 
20
 Cari M. STEVENS. «The analysis of voluntary arbitration; contract disputes. » 
Industrial Relations. V. 7, No. 1 October 1967. pp. 71-9. 
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internai grievance procédure, the union must sélect between the three 
alternatives of dropping the grievance, going to arbitration or trying to 
bargain for the grievance. 
The union's décision will be influenced by the timing of the griev-
ance relative to the start of a new round of collective bargaining and 
the expected duration of the grievance arbitration procédure. If there 
are seven months to go before a new set of negotiations begin, and if 
the union expects the grievance arbitration procédure to take nine 
months then other things being equal, the union would tend to try to 
win its grievance through collective bargaining rather than through 
arbitration. It is hypothesized that, ceteris paribus, a réduction in the 
time taken to process arbitration cases would resuit in greater use of 
arbitration for the resolution of grievances thereby increasing the 
case load. 
The time taken to process a grievance through arbitration, and the 
time to the next round of negotiations, may also influence an individual's 
décision as to how hard he would pressure the trade union to press 
his grievance. We can only speculate how many more dismissals or 
penalties would be grieved if an «instant» or at least extremely fast 
grievance arbitration procédure was available for use. How many 
individuals are simply deterred from grieving in the knowledge that it 
could take over six months before their case would be heard by an 
arbitrator and in the knowledge that, in the intérim, the penalty is in 
force ? 
Thus timing considérations will influence both the choice between 
collective bargaining and arbitration and the désire of a grievor to seek 
satisfaction of his grievance. 
It will be shown, in the next section of this paper, that the time 
taken to process arbitration cases could be affected by législative and 
administrative action by governments. The législative and administrative 
framework is shown, in Figure 1, as an independent variable influencing 
the timing considérations in the model. 
COSTS-BENEFITS 
The sélection of procédure, from the set of suitable and feasible 
alternatives, is explained in this model by the maximization of Subjec-
tively Expected Utility (SEU). The SEU function21 has four compo-
21
 The subjectively expected utility (SEU) of an alternative is the product of the 
subjective utility and the subjective probability of success associated with that alternative. 
W. EDWARDS. «Behavioral Décision Theory. » Annual Review of Psychology. V. 12 
(1961). pp. 473-98. 
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nents; the expected benefits of success, the expected costs of failure, 
the costs and benefits associated with the use of the procédures and the 
probabilities of the outcomes associated with the choice of procédure. 
The benefits of success and costs of failure may be instrumental, 
political or psychological. Instrumental benefits and costs include those 
of a financial nature, such as wages to be gained or lost, or of a non-
financial nature such as rights to accept or reject certain job assign-
ments. 
Political benefits or costs may be reflected, for example, in 
changes in the security of the leadership, the influence of the i inter-
national or national organization on the local or the standing of the 
paid staff représentative or business agent. There may be some positive 
benefit involved in winning the grievance of a pohtically active member 
of the bargaining unit which might not exist for a non-active member. 
The évidence that political influences affect grievance processing is 
apocryphal rather than empirical. There is considérable évidence link-
ing political activity in the union with grievors22 and it is probable that 
the rank and file's assessment of the quality of union leadership is 
influenced, at least in part, by the union's performance in the pros-
ecution of grievances and its success rate in obtaining redress23. 
Psychological benefits may include the intrinsic satisfaction of 
helping a friend or workmate or the pleasure derived from «defeating 
the enemy». Psychological costs would include the dissatisfaction 
resulting from a failure to do thèse same things. 
The costs and benefits associated with success and failure will 
be influenced by the balance of power between the parties, intra-union 
political dynamics and the legal-administrative framework within which 
the conflict resolution procédures functions. 
The balance of power between the parties will détermine the costs 
of concessions the union will need to make to «win» the grievance 
or the amount of coercive power it can exert in a given situation24. 
22
 H. A. SULKIN and R. W. PRANIS. «Comparison of grievants and non-
grievants in a heavy machinery company. » Personnel Psychology. V. 20, No. 2. 1967. 
pp. 111-20 D. PEACH and E. R. LIVERNASH. Grievance Initiation and Resolution; 
A study in basic steel. Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 
1974. 
23
 SEIDMAN, J., J. LONDON, B. KARSH and Daisy L. TAGLIOCOZZO. 
The Worker Views His Union. Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press, 19:58. 
24
 For more discussion of the concept of «balance of power» see THOMSON 
and MURRAY, op. cit. 
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The powerful union may be able to hâve a member reinstated, despite 
just cause for discharge, either by threat of reprisai or by offering some 
concession desired by management. The weak union may be unable to 
threaten management and may hâve to make som substantial concession 
in order to «win» the grievance. We would therefore expect to see 
some relationship between the procédures chosen for conflict resolution 
for grievances and other measures of relative union-management 
strength such as économie gains in collective bargaining. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to analyze the causes of such power or influence 
which may be rooted in traditional relationships, labour and product 
market conditions or relative financial resources. 
The legal-administrative framework exerts a direct influence on 
the balance of power between the parties insofar as it dictâtes and 
sanctions the actions the parties might take at a spécifie point of time. 
The prevailing Canadian législation, specifically the mandatory no-
strike provision in most jurisdictions, means that the power of the union 
over the grievance must be at its lowest ebb immediately following 
the signing of a new collective agreement if the union poses a significant 
threat to management by striking. As the time in which strikes are légal 
draws closer, the union's power will increase, other things being equal. 
The political dynamics within the union will also influence the costs 
of failure and the benefîts of success. Included in such dynamics are 
the security of the leadership, the factionalization within the union local 
and the political characteristics of the grievors. There may be many 
political forces acting on the decision-maker including leadership 
pressure from above and pressures from the rank and file below. As 
the locus of décision making moves, so the political forces assume a 
différent configuration. 
In addition to the benefits and costs associated with success and 
failure there are a group of benefits and costs which are independent 
of the outeome of choice of procédure; thèse are called procédure 
benefits and costs. They may be instrumental or political in nature. 
Procédural costs include tangible items such as the costs of arbitrators' 
fées, meeting rooms, payments to witnesses, the costs of the personnel 
involved in preparing and presenting cases or the « costs » of worsened 
relationships resulting from the use of distributive bargaining tactics. 
Benefits may be derived from the rank and file support for the leader-
ship that may be encouraged by the adoption of overall policies such 
as the prosecution of ail grievances arising from discharges ail the 
way to arbitration in order to demonstrate militance or representative-
ness. Grievances on a collective bargaining agenda may also hâve some 
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positive tactical value in focusing attention on important issues for 
negotiation rather than being there in anticipation of «winning» them 
in the présent contract. 
Both the legal-administrative framework and the political dynamics 
within the union may be expected to influence thèse procédural benefits 
and costs. The former exerts an influence insofar as it establishes the 
costs that the parties hâve to bear and the onus on the union for fair 
représentation of ail members of the bargaining unit. The intra-union 
political dynamics will influence the benefits and costs of procédure 
sélection through establishing the conséquences of such choices to 
the décision maker(s). 
Finally the SEU function must take into account the probability 
of succeeding in winning the grievance. In the case of arbitration this 
will be a subjective estimate based on an assessment of the merits of 
the case and will be highly influenced by previous expérience with 
similar cases in previous arbitrations, either within the spécifie orga-
nization in question or in the gênerai field of industrial arbitration. 
The function must take into account the fact that «winning» is not a 
simple issue itself. Where the arbitrator has the licence to modify a 
penalty, as is the case in most discharge and discipline cases in Ontario, 
«winning» may involve the substitution of a lesser penalty or the 
complète reversai of management's actions. The same situation applies 
to bargaining, either in formai collective bargaining or in the grievance 
procédure. There is, in effect, a range of possible outeomes from 
winning completely to only a minor managerial concession; in addition 
there will be différent probabilities attached to obtaining some benefit 
from différent levels of union concession.25 
The final sélection of appropriate alternatives will be on the basis 
of the pathway offering the greatest subjectively expected utility (SEU) 
where SEU is represented as : 
n
 (Pw x Benefits) — (1-Pw) x Costs))] 
SEU = 2 
i = 1 
+ (Procédure Benefits — Procédure Costs) 
Where : 
Pw is the probability of winning the grievance. 
Benefits are those associated with winning. 
Costs are those associated with losing. 
25
 WALTON and MCKERSIE expand the SEU function to accomodate the 
collective bargaining process. Op. cit. p. 37. 
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Procédure benefits and costs are those associated with the 
use of the procédure independent of winning or losing. 
SEU is summed over ail possible outcomes from the 
procédure choice. 
The pathway chosen will the one which offers the greatest SEU, 
other things being equal. 
THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY CHANGE 
The model described above can be used to analyze a number 
of possible policy initiatives which would change the légal and admin-
istrative framework within which binding arbitration opérâtes. Before 
analyzing the probable effects of changes which would alter costs and 
timing constraints, it should be made clear that there will be a group 
of grievances totally unaffected by such changes. 
The model implies that grievances representing common problem 
conflict, occurring in good labour relations climates, will not end up at 
arbitration. If they are not resolved in the grievance procédure they will 
be dealt with in collective bargaining. The only grievances that could 
end up at arbitration are those representing competitive-issue conflict or 
which arise in poor climates. 
Critics of eased access to grievance arbitration say that this will 
be a disincentive for the parties to résolve their own problems through 
bi-lateral negotiations. If the conflict is a competitive-issue type, créative 
solutions, benefitting both parties, are unobtainable. On the other hand, 
if the conflict is a common-problem type but the climate is poor, then 
integrative, problem-solving behaviour will not be engaged in. We 
therefore question the supposition that bi-lateral negotiation will yield 
a qualitatively superior solution to third party arbitration. It is true 
that there is a valid argument that participation in a décision process 
is likely to improve commitment to that décision, another argument 
in favour of bi-lateral negotiations. However arbitration, through the 
présentation of reasoned arguments, offers participation to the parties. 
On balance, the argument suggested by those who oppose easier access 
does not hold up to close scrutiny. 
There is an argument which would favour the transfer of griev-
ances from collective bargaining to arbitration. The extremely poly-
centric nature of collective bargaining has been pointed out by a number 
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of authors.26 Any move to lessen this polycentricity, by removing griev-
ances and as many rights issues as possible from bargaining over interest 
disputes which can be represented financially, may well simplify the 
collective bargaining process. 
This section will deal with a number of changes to législative 
and administrative provisions in Ontario which would: 
a. Reduce the cost of arbitration to the trade unions. 
b. Reduce the time taken to convene arbitration boards, schedule 
hearings and issue awards. 
c. Facilitate médiation prior to arbitration. 
Reducing the cost to the union 
Reducing the cost of arbitration to the union would increase its 
SEU both absolutely and relative to the SEU of collective bargaining. 
This would resuit in an increase in arbitration case volume emanating 
from three sources. 
There would be a transfer of grievances from collective bargain-
ing, or bargaining in the grievance procédure, to arbitration. It has been 
argued that such a transfer, if it reduces the polycentricity of collective 
bargaining, may be bénéficiai from the point of view of public policy. 
It would certainly be a step in the direction of using arbitration for 
the purpose it is best suited for. 
There would be an increase in case load from grievances that had 
previously been dropped, even though they were justifiable, because of 
financial constraints on the local union. Managements are unlikely to 
view such developments with favour since, inevitably, this represents 
more challenges to managerial rights. From the point of view of public 
policy however, the issue involves one of equity for the worker and a 
more subtle implication for industrial relations as a whole. We need 
to ask the question as to who benefits if justifiable grievances are 
repressed through lack of the financial resources to résolve them ? Such 
unresolved conflict, if felt by the grievor(s) can only resuit in manifest 
conflict in the form of lowered productivity and increased labour-
26
 D.J.M. BROWN. Interest Arbitration. Privy Council, Ottawa. Queens Printer. 
1970. P. C. WEILER. «The rôle of the arbitrator; alternative versions.» University of 
Toronto Law Journal. V. 19, No. 1. 1969. p. 33. Thèse and other authors draw on the 
work of L. L. FULLER, an unpublished manuscript entitled «The forms and limits of 
adjudication. » 
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management hostility.27 A case could be made for encouraging ail 
worthwhile grievances to be referred to arbitration. 
The third source of increased volume poses a more difficult 
problem. The removal of financial constraints would make it almost 
impossible for the union leader to refuse to process a grievance through 
to arbitration even if the grievance was clearly unwarranted or frivolous. 
The political pressures to process grievances would increase if the costs 
were eliminated and the arbitration procédure could become flooded 
with such spurious, unjustifiable grievances. 
We are not in a position to estimate the potential increased volume 
associated with each of thèse sources, although research could be 
conducted to throw more light on the issue. The implications for policy 
initiatives are such that complète élimination of cost to the union would 
appear to risk a massive increase in the use of arbitration with the 
increase reflecting, to some substantial extent, intra-union political 
factors. However there could be considération of two possible ini-
tiatives. There could be partial relief from the cost burden, perhaps 
by making the arbitrator's fee a public expense and limiting the union's 
and employer's costs to their own out-of-pocket and personnel costs. 
Another alternative, more radical in nature, may be to award costs 
for arbitration just as costs are awarded in civil légal actions. This 
should not deter the processing of justifiable grievances but would deter 
spurious grievances ; in addition it is likely to encourage more systematic 
pre-screening of grievances by the parties prior to arbitration. 
Reduce arbitration duration 
The average arbitration case is estimated to take over seven 
months from the time the grievance is first presented to the time an 
award is handed down.28 The time delays occur for a number of 
reasons. Décisions to take matters to arbitration are, themselves, time 
consuming especially if some form of démocratie process is involved 
and the grievor chooses to appeal décisions made by the local's leader-
ship.29 
27
 I. KATZ. « Minimizing disputes through adjustment of grievances. » Law and 
Contemporary Problems. V. 12, No. 2. Spring, 1947. 
28
 H. GOLDBLATT. Op.c it. 
29
 The United StellWorkers procédure allows a grievor whose grievance was 
not processed by the stewards committee to appeal directly to a gênerai membership 
meeting and other unions hâve similar internai appeals procédures which may be time 
consuming. 
32
 P. C. WEILLER. «The rôle of the arbitrator. » Op. cit. p. 24. 
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There is extensive use of tripartite boards with the inhérent 
problems of juggling the schedules of a busy arbitrator and nominees 
from the union and management. This practice persists despite over-
whelming évidence pointing to time savings involved in the use of sole 
arbitrators.30 
There is frequently difficulty involved in reaching agreement on a 
suitable Chairman, one acceptable to both parties. Stutudies in both the 
United States and Canada hâve shown that the same few arbitrators 
handle most arbitrations.31 There is no research which shows which 
party, either management or the union, is most reluctant to use less 
experienced arbitrators; the indications are that both parties tend to 
prefer the arbitrator whose track record is known. 
The model developed in this paper shows that a réduction in the 
time taken to process an arbitration would resuit in an increase in arbi-
tration case load. The increase would stem from two sources. There 
would be some transfer from collective bargaining and this transfer 
would, it is argued, be largely bénéficiai for ail the parties. There would 
also be more cases reaching arbitration which would otherwise be 
dropped since individual grievors may be inclined to use a procédure 
to which there is an end in sight from the start. If this results in in-
creased conflict resolution then it is probably désirable. However there 
could also be an increase in spurious grievances if the grievors can hâve 
an «instant» hearing for a grievance. There is no évidence that this 
has happened in the published reports of expedited arbitration pro-
cédures. It is suspected that it would only be likely to happen in the 
case of «instant» arbitrations and that moves to reduce the current 
lengthy procédure would only be bénéficiai to ail concerned. 
A number of such policy initiatives could be taken, mainly in the 
form of educational and administrative actions. The benefits of sole 
arbitrators or permanent umpires compared with tri-partite boards could 
be widely publicized, the establishment of acceptable Chairman in the 
collective agreement could be encouraged and either party to the 
collective agreement could insist that a sole arbitrator hear the case if 
30
 H. GOLDBLATT. Op. cit. R. WERRY and R. CAREW. «An enquiry into 
the prépondérance of tri-partite arbitration boards in Ontario.» Queens Law Journal. 
V. 1, No. 1 (1971) P. W. LOCKETT. «An enquiry into the utility of tri-partite arbitra-
tion boards.» Queens Law Journal. V. 1, No. 1 (1971) 
31
 Ibid. pp. 49-50. W. J. PRIMEAUX Jr. and D. E. BRANNEN. «Why few 
arbitrators are deemed acceptable.» Monthly Labor Review. V. 98, No. 9 September 
1975. 
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there was an indication that insistence on a tripartite board was de-
finitely delaying the scheduling of a hearing. 
Facilitating médiation 
In the model it is suggested that the only types of grievances 
which become subject to the choice between arbitration and collective 
bargaining are competitive-issue grievances and those that occur in 
poor labour relations climates. The reality is that a number of griev-
ances which represent common-problem conflict types do end up at 
arbitration, a procédure singularly unsuited for their resolution in any 
way which mutually benefits the parties. 
While some collective agreements specify that the arbitrator may 
take the rôle of mediator, and other jurisdictions hâve législation which 
facilitâtes médiation before adjudication, most législation severely 
curtails the ability of an arbitrator to act in this fashion. The most 
common cause for the overthrow of arbitration awards by a higher 
court stems from the arbitrator acting outside his jurisdiction ; there 
is always the risk of that when attempting to médiate between parties 
when the climate is poor. 
There are many problems involved in trying to alter the arbitration 
process to facilitate médiation. Weiler has suggested that collective 
agreements hâve become so detailed, so legalistic that the arbitrator 
simply has «no room to move» to fashion a compromise agreement.32 
In addition it is questionable whether there are sufficient trained 
personnel to develop the in-depth knowledge of the issues and the 
intimacy with the parties that constitute essential prerequisites for 
successful médiation. 
Thèse problems may be insurmountable. It is hoped, however, that 
this model may hâve helped focus attention on the clear need for some 
form of process which will help identify pseudo and common-problem 
conflicts which end up in the arbitration procédure. We hâve com-
pulsory médiation in collective bargaining, although the sincerity with 
which the parties participate in it is questionable, why not some serious 
considération for greater use of médiation in the grievance procédure, 
either by the arbitrator or as a prearbitration stage ? 
THE NEED FOR RESEARCH 
In the extensive literature on arbitration, there is very little empir-
ical research reported. Given the important rôle that arbitration plays 
32
 P. C. WEILLER. «The rôle of the arbitrator. » Op. cit. p. 24. 
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in the industrial relations System, this is both surprising and a cause 
for concern. The empirical support for the tentative model proposed in 
this paper is almost non-existent. The model is derived from a review 
of existing, non-empirical, literature and interviews with a small number 
of arbitrators and union personnel. 
There is need for two forms of research. Most obvious is the 
need for better descriptions of the arbitration procédure than we cur-
rently hâve. It would be helpful in formulating the appropriate research 
questions if we knew the number of grievances that are arbitrated, 
compared with the number being settled through other channels, the 
issues the grievances represent, the unions and managements participat-
ing in the procédure and the nature of awards. The time taken up in 
the arbitration procédure needs to be analyzed, beyond the level of the 
Labour Council's study,33 to identify the causes of delays in the System. 
In addition there is a need to establish the actual costs that the parties 
to arbitration hâve to bear. 
The second major need is for an investigation of the factors affect-
ing the use of arbitration instead of the bargaining procédures and 
whether or not the costs and time delays involved in arbitration do 
inhibit the processing of justifiable grievances. One of the purposes of 
developing and presenting this model was to identify a number of 
possible factors and guide researchers toward the development of 
research stratégies. 
A number of potential research stratégies should be further in-
vestigated. The concepts of labour relations climate, conflict type and 
balance of power could be operationalized in terms of « macro » variables 
such as strike incidence, grievance issues, financial states of the parties, 
labour and product market conditions, size and previous collective 
bargaining results. A correlational study which involved the investiga-
tion of variations in the frequency of arbitration usage in terms of thèse 
variables may offer some support for sections of this model. 
A « micro » strategy would involve an attempt to measure directly 
the variables specified as being factors associated with procédure 
choice in this paper. A sample of grievances in an organization could 
be intensively studied and an attempt made to détermine, on a post 
hoc basis, the factors associated with the actual décisions made by the 
union. This would involve attempting to measure the union's assess-
ment of the costs and benefits associated with alternative procédures 
33
 H. GOLDBLATT. Op. cit. 
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as well as its perceptions of confîict type and labour relations climate. 
Such a strategy offers the potential for validating the model by com-
parison of two random samples of grievances, one used to develop the 
estimâtes of the variables and the other used for prédiction and validation. 
In addition to thèse stratégies there is also the benefit to be gained 
from intensive studies of actual situations in which expedited, low-
cost arbitration has been used and from a comparison of the arbitration 
procédure in other jurisdictions in which médiation is encouraged, costs 
are lower and the time taken in the procédure is much less. While 
isolâted reports of such cases appear quite regularly in the literature, 
systematic comparative studies hâve not been conducted. There is 
undoubtedly much that could be learned from such comparative 
analyses and intensive case studies. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to arrange some important déterminants 
of the choice of binding arbitration in an overall framework which 
facilitâtes police analysis and provides some direction for future research. 
At first sight the research problems appear to be formidable. There 
are problems of access to organizations, operationalization of such 
concepts as labour relations climate, confîict type and, of course, the 
problems invojved in measuring subjective expected utilities. There are 
the ever présent problems, so well described by Kuhn, of separating 
appearances from realities. There are problems associated with the 
changing locus of décision making and determining the real bases of 
décisions in politically complex situations. Thèse problems cannot be 
taken lightly.34 
With concerns about worker dissatisfaction and aliénation, lowered 
productivity and poor labour-management relations, it is hoped that 
overcoming thèse problems will be viewed as a research challenge 
rather than as inhibiting factors preventing research into this important 
field of industrial jurisprudence. 
J. W. KUHN. Bargaining in Grievance Seulement, Op. cit. 
652 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIFLLFS. VOL. 3i. NO 4 
L'arbitrage des griefs 
Le but de l'article précédent est de mettre au point un schéma permettant de 
préciser les différents facteurs qui déterminent un syndicat à décider de recourir à l'arbi-
trage pendant la durée d'une convention collective. L'objet de ce schéma est l'analyse 
des répercussions probables de changements qui seraient destinés à accélérer le pro-
cessus de l'arbitrage, à en réduire le coût pour les syndicats et à faciliter le recours à 
la médiation avant l'arbitrage. L'auteur discute des conséquences de ces changements 
du point de vue de la direction, des syndicats et de l'État. 
L'article s'applique d'abord à l'Ontario, mais il vaut aussi pour les autres provin-
ces canadiennes et plusieurs États Américains, car l'arbitrage exécutoire, en tant que 
stade ultime de la procédure de griefs, est obligatoire partout au Canada, sauf en 
Saskatchewan. On retrouve également un régime similaire dans la plupart des conventions 
collectives outre-frontière. 
Cette généralisation de l'arbitrage exécutoire ne signifie pas qu'il soit exempt de 
critiques. On estime que les délais sont beaucoup trop longs, que l'enquête est conduite 
d'une manière beaucoup trop formelle, que les décisions sont trop souvent sujettes à 
révision par les cours civiles, que l'obligation pour les syndicats d'avoir généralement à 
en défrayer la moitié du coût empêche les plus faibles d'y recourir suffisamment. 
Ceux qui désirent le maintien du régime actuel estiment qu'il est possible pour 
les intéressés de l'améliorer en établissant, à l'intérieur des conventions, leur propre 
système d'arbitrage. Ils considèrent aussi que toute tentative pour en réduire le coût 
se traduira par la multiplication des griefs déférés à des tiers. 
L'auteur signale que, sous le présent régime, le syndicat, suivant les circonstan-
ces, a un triple choix: soumettre le grief à l'arbitrage, réserver la question pour règle-
ment à la prochaine ronde de négociations ou, tout simplement, l'abandonner. Ce triple 
choix dépend de la situation de force dans laquelle se trouve le syndicat au moment du 
grief. Si le grief n'est pas abandonné, le syndicat pourra demander l'arbitrage, ce qui 
peut inciter la direction à le régler. Si la direction ne bouge pas et si l'on est à la veille 
d'entreprendre de nouvelles négociations, il se peut que le syndicat préfère tenter de 
trouver une solution au moment des conventions collectives. 
L'auteur passe ensuite à l'analyse de la conception que les arbitres se font de 
leur rôle, les uns s'en tenant à l'interprétation stricte de la convention; d'autres, beaucoup 
moins nombreux, cherchant à jouer si possible le rôle d'un médiateur. D'une façon géné-
rale, l'arbitrage est généralement considéré comme un procès, les parties présentant 
une argumentation, s'appuyant sur une jurisprudence et citant des témoins. 
La nature des griefs est aussi fort variée. Les uns portent sur des questions de 
fait précises; d'autres viennent s'insérer dans le processus même des négociations col-
lectives. Il est rare que l'on soit en présence de conflits de droit pur. On est la plupart 
du temps en présence d'un conflit de droit auquel viennent s'ajouter des questions d'in-
térêts. 
Il arrive également que l'on se trouve en présence de pseudo-conflits, c'est-
à-dire que les conflits sont inexistants, les parties ne se comprenant pas ou faisant 
mine de ne pas se comprendre. 
En effet, les rapports entre des contractants assujettis à une convention col-
lective sont de plusieurs types. Les uns sont en opposition marquée cherchant à se 
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détruire ou à s'affaiblir l'un et l'autre. D'autres adoptent une attitude d'agression 
mutuelle, mais l'un accepte l'existence légitime de l'autre. D'autres encore cherchent à 
s'accommoder: ils ne vont pas jusqu'à travailler à se démolir, mais ne prêtent aucune 
assistance, gardant des rapports courtois de stricte neutralité. Enfin, il y a ceux qui mar-
chent la main dans la main en parfaite collusion. 
L'existence de ces climats variés exerce, cela va de soi, une influence sur le 
type des conflits qui se produisent, sur la façon dont ils sont perçus et aussi sur les 
modes de règlements de griefs qu'on recherche. 
À partir des observations précédentes, l'auteur simplifie les choses en estimant 
qu'il s'installe généralement deux types de climats: les uns, bons, où l'on s'efforce de 
coopérer, de s'accommoder; les autres, mauvais, où l'on se défie sans cesse mutuelle-
ment. 
Dans le premier cas, il y a peu de pseudo-conflits, puisque ceux-ci ont tendance 
à se résoudre entre les parties, c'est-à-dire que les problèmes se règlent aux divers 
stades de la procédure des griefs. Au contraire, si le climat de l'entreprise est mauvais, 
il y a de fortes chances que le mécanisme mis en place pour le règlement des griefs 
fonctionnera mal, le syndicat devant choisir l'arbitrage, retenir le grief en vue de son rè-
glement au moment de la négociation collective ou se résigner à le laisser tomber. 
C'est ici qu'intervient le choix de la méthode à suivre. Par exemple, on sait que 
la procédure de règlement des griefs précède le recours à l'arbitrage. La décision du 
syndicat sera alors influencée par le moment où se soulève un grief. Si l'on est à la 
veille d'entamer de nouvelles négociations et que l'on sait que les délais seront longs 
avant d'obtenir une décision, le syndicat cherchera à régler le différend par le biais de 
la négociation collective, d'où l'on peut déduire que des considérations de temps jouent 
un rôle important dans la décision de porter ou non un grief à l'arbitrage. L'autre 
aspect, qui entre en ligne de compte, a trait aux gains que l'on peut obtenir. Parfois, 
quand il s'agit de problèmes relatifs aux salaires, il est possible d'évaluer les avantages 
qu'on pourra tirer d'une victoire, mais quand il s'agit des droits d'un individu, il est 
bien plus difficile de trouver une unité de mesure. Le syndicat tient également compte 
des dépenses qu'il aura à effectuer au cours d'un arbitrage comparativement aux gains 
qu'il escompte obtenir par la décision et également au risque qu'il court de ne pas avoir 
gain de cause. 
Le schéma précédent permet d'étudier plusieurs possibilités de modifier les lois 
suivant lesquelles le système d'arbitrage avec décision exécutoire peut fonctionner. Ce 
schéma implique que, là où les relations sont bonnes, la plupart des griefs ne se rendront 
pas à l'arbitrage. C'est pourquoi les adversaires de la modification du régime estiment 
que rendre l'arbitrage plus facile d'accès, c'est inviter les parties à ne pas faire tous 
les efforts voulus pour régler directement les conflits, mais on peut se demander aussi 
si un régime d'arbitrage moins dispendieux, moins long, moins formaliste ne serait pas 
un bon moyen de faciliter les négociations collectives. 
La réduction du coût de l'arbitrage, de sa durée et de son formalisme aurait pour 
effet de débarrasser la négociation collective de nombreuses questions qui conduisent 
souvent à des impasses mais, cela accroîtrait le volume des griefs et forcerait aussi le 
syndicat à poursuivre des griefs qui ne sont pas sérieux. 
L'auteur conclut son étude en disant que, étant donné le rôle important que joue 
l'arbitrage dans les relations de travail, il faudrait pousser plus loin les recherches dans 
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ce domaine pour mieux connaître d'abord le fonctionnement du processus d'arbitrage et 
ensuite pour mieux comprendre les facteurs qui poussent les syndicats à y recourir, 
ce à quoi l'on peut arriver par l'étude plus poussée de la formation et du cheminement 
de beaucoup de griefs. 
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— une analyse serrée des douze 
nentes de la Cour suprême du 
dernières décisions perti-
Canada 
Vu le nombre limité de cette première édition, on peut déjà retenir son 
exemplaire en s'adressant aux : 
PRESSES DE L'UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL 
UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL 
STE-FOY, QUÉBEC 
ou en téléphonant à: (418) 656-2320 ou 656-2433 
Prix: $9.95 l'unité (à inclure avec votre commande) 
